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Abstract 
Skewness of return has been suggested as a reason why agents might choose to 
gamble, ceteris paribus, in Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). We investigate the 
relationship between moments of return in two models where agents choices over 
uncertain outcomes are determined as in CPT. We illustrate via examples that in 
CPT theory, as with expected utility theory, propositions that agents have a 
preference for skewness may be invalid.  
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Skewness as an Explanation of Gambling in Cumulative Prospect Theory. 
 
Introduction: 
 
A preference for skewness of return, ceteris paribus, is often suggested as a 
reason why agents might choose to gamble in the context of cumulative prospect 
theory, (CPT), (see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992)). For example Barberis and Huang (2005) write, “through the probability 
weighting function, cumulative prospect theory investors exhibit a preference for  
(positive) skewness. Whilst Taleb (2004) suggests that “On the other hand, the 
value function of prospect theory documents a decreased sensitivity to both gains 
and losses, hence a marked overall preference for negative skewness”. 
A similar conjecture concerning skewness of return has also been made in the 
context of expected utility theory. For example Golec and Tamarkin (1998) assert  
“horse bettors accept low-return, high-variance bets because they enjoy the high 
skewness offered by these bets” and “we claim that bettors could be risk-averse 
and favour positive skewness, and primarily trade off negative expected return and 
variance for positive skewness. 
In the context of expected utility theory the rationale for a positive skew preference 
is that the third derivative of the utility function of a globally risk-averse agent is 
positive, and approximation of the utility function to order three implies a valid 
trade-off between mean, variance and skewness of return, that is, preferring a 
higher third moment for two random variables having equal means and variances 
(Kraus and Litzenberger (1976)). 
In fact the argument is in general incorrect for the expected utility maximiser. 
Brockett and Garven (1998) show that one can always construct two distributions 
with a given moment ordering for which neither stochastically dominates the other 
at any degree of stochastic dominance i
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Given the conflicting statements concerning the preference of agents for skewness 
in cumulative prospect theory (and that the related conjectures in expected utility 
theory are incorrect), the purpose in this note is to investigate the relationship 
between moments of return, particularly skewness of return, in two models where 
agent’s choices over uncertain outcomes are determined as in CPT. 
The first model involves an agent undertaking a fixed stake gamble involving gains 
and losses. The second model is of a simple portfolio decision where the agent can 
purchase a safe asset paying an interest rate, h, or a bond that entitles you to 
participate in a lottery that pays X with probability p or zero otherwise. The key 
feature of the bond is that you do not loose your stake. You can cash in your 
holdings of the bond at any time. The UK government markets such a bond, called 
a National Premium Bond. It offers an expected rate of return that appears lower 
than the safe rate of return given by the interest rate paid on Treasury bills or 
Building Societies.ii Holdings of premium bonds are constrained by the UK 
government to a maximum of £30,000 and some 147,000 UK citizens hold this 
amount.  Given the relatively large holdings by agents, with expenditure per year of 
some £2 billion, and a minimum purchase amount of £100, entertainment, as 
opposed to financial return, is, apriori, an unsatisfactory rationale for agents 
purchasing them. It is interesting to observe therefore that the UK government 
regards holdings of premium bonds as a form of saving but in the Budd report on 
Prevalence of Gambling in the UK (2001) they are considered as a component of 
gambling expenditure. Because the safe rate interest rate typically exceeds the 
expected rate of interest on bonds, we suggest that from the perspective of the 
standard expected utility model their holding constitutes an anomaly for many 
agents.   
In the next section we set out our two models and analyse their implications. The 
final section of the note is a brief conclusion. 
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2.Some Analysis  
We specify the value function as having the expo-power form which is a 
generalization of the power form  employed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)iii. .
Defining reference point utility as zero, for a gamble to occur in CPT we require 
expected utility or value (EU) to be non-negative. For the expo-power value 
function expected value is given by   
EU w p e p er s o sn n n=   +  ( )( ) ( )1 0 w 1- ) (1-  - (1)                                               
where the win-probability is given by p, and the functions w p+( ) and w p ( )1 are 
non-linear s-shaped probability weighting functions, o are the odds and s the 
stake.   r n, , and     are positive constants with 0 1< n . The agent is risk-
averse over gains and risk seeking over losses as assumed in CPT.  
The value function in (1) has upper and lower bounds, as is required to resolve the 
St.Petersburg Paradox (see e.g. Bassett (1997)). The expo-power function also has 
the convenient property that as  	 0, the value function approximates the power 
form employed by Tversky and Kahneman.  
The degree of loss aversion, (LA) is defined by the ratio of the value of gain to the 
value of loss from a symmetric gamble, o = 1 and is given by  
LA e
e
r s
s
n
n=




( )
( )
1
1


(2) 
From (2), as stake size approaches zero loss aversion would require that r

<1.
and for large stake size 1 1

< . In order to ensure that the degree of loss aversion 
increases with stake size, we also require r  1.
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We assume that the probability weighting functions over gains and losses are as 
employed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and given by 
 
where 
 and  are constants. 
.
The expected return from a one-unit stake gamble is defined by, µ1 , where 
µ µ1 1 1= +  po p( )( ) or = p(1+o)  (4)  
 so that the return from an s stake gamble is  
s pos p sµ1 1= +  ( )( )  (5) 
Skewness of return is given by  
µ µ3
3 3
2
1 1 2 =  s p p
p
( )( )  (6) 
where  µ µ= +( )1 1 and an actuarially fair bet is defined when µ µ1 0 1= =or .  
We assume that stake size is fixed at 10 units. We set the values of the parameters 
in the probability weighting functions at 
 = 0 61. and = 0.69 , those reported by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 We let n = 088. , r = 20, k = 45 = 0.00001.
As noted above as  	 0 , we obtain precisely the same specification of CPT and 
parameter values as reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Because our 
choice of  is small our specification will exhibit the same features as that of 
Tversky and Kahneman for almost all of the probability range. 
 Substituting (4) and (3) into (1) we can write expected value solely as a function of 
expected return and win probability. Also using (6) we can write expected value 
solely as a function of skewness and expected return.  
 We plot the indifference curves between expected return and win probability and 
expected return and skewness of return for EU=0 in Figures 1(a) to 1(g). 
w p p
p p
w p p
p p
+ =
+ 
 =

+ 
( )
( ( ) )
( ) ( )
( ( ) )



 
 


  1
1 1
1
1 1, (3)
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Figures 1(a)-1(c) Indifference Curves between Expected Return and Win Probability    
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Figures 1(d)-1(g) Indifference Curves between Expected Return and Skewness of Return 
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In Figures 1(a) and 1(b) we observe that the indifference curve exhibits a maximum 
in the range of actuarially fair bets and that the agent requires around $30 to stake. 
$10 at a probability of 0.5. These figures are the same as  those reported by 
students in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) experiments. We also note that due to 
probability distortion the agent will gamble at actuarially unfair odds on long shots. 
 In Figure1(c) we observe that at low enough probabilities the indifference curve 
exhibits a minimum and an asymptote. This is a resultant of the bounded ness of 
the value function. Ultimately boundedness implies that the agents will only take 
very long shot bets at actuarially fair odds and will ultimately reject some long shot 
bets regardless of the rate of return. This behaviour differs from that with a power 
function. It is discussed further in Cain et al (2005).  
 The indifference curve between expected return and skewness is plotted in Figures 
1(d) to 1(g). The indifference curve has properties that reflect that for expected 
return and win probability. The important point to note is that the trade-off changes 
sign. For probabilities close to a half the trade-off is positive as shown in (1d) as the 
probability declines the trade-off exhibits a maximum and then a negative trade-off. 
For very low probabilities (very high positive skewness) the trade-off exhibits a 
minimum and   the trade-off becomes positive as shown in Figure (1e). Clearly in 
some regions of positive skewness the agent requires a higher expected return to 
compensate for higher positive skewness. For probabilities between 0.5 and 2/3 the 
trade-off is negative, so the agent accepts more negative skewness and lower 
expected rates of return. For probabilities between 2/3 and 1 this is reversed, the 
agent exhibiting indifference between lower expected returns and less negative 
skewness. The Figures illustrate that there is no simple relationship between 
expected return and skewness of return for a fixed stake gamble in CPT. 
In model 2 we assume that the agent has wealth of one unit to invest in a safe 
asset yielding h% and a premium bond yielding b%. The agent invests a and 1-a in 
the safe asset and premium bond respectively. In this model we assume that  n=1 
so as to allow a tractable analytic solution. The premium bond pays X with 
probability p so that b pX= .
Expected Value under CPT is given by: 
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EU w p e w p eah a X ah=  +  +  +  + ( )( ) ( ( ))( )( ( ) )1 1 11  (7) 
The expected return of the portfolio is  ER p ah a X p ah= +  + ( ( ) ) ( )1 1
the variance,  2
2 21 1
=
 ( ) ( )a b p
p
and skewness, 3
3 3
2
1 1 2 1
=
  ( ) ( )( )a b p p
p
.
The optimal share of the portfolio in the safe asset, where 

=


<
EU
a
EU
a
0 0
2
2, , is 
given by 
a
w p X h
w p h
X
= 


+

1 1
ln ( ){ }
( ( ))

(8)  
We assume the parameters 
  = = = =0 61 0 3 0 05 0 3. , . , . , . .h
Portfolio A  has X p= =250 0 0001, . and aq value of a = 0.9613805,  which is optimal.
This gives   the following moments for the portfolio; .
Expected Return(ER)
Variance (
skewness(
=
=
= =



4 90345 10
9 3207 10
8 9972 10 99 98
2
2 3
3
2 3
2 1 5
. *( )
) . *( )
) . *( ) ,
( )
..

 

with EU = 0 01767. .
For purposes of comparison the expected utility or value of the portfolio with  a=1 
and a=0 are EU = 0 01489. and EU = 0.0036 respectively. 
Consider now a  Portfolio B. This has X p a= = =130611 8 742008 10 0 9756. , . *( ), . .  
These numbers generate   the following moments for the portfolio .
ER =
=
= =


4 90345 10
9 3207 10
0 3043 388 21
2
2 3
3
3
2 1 5
. *( )
. *( ),
. ,
( )
..

 

with EU = 0 0153266.
Comparing portfolio’s A and B we observe that they have identical means and 
variances but that B exhibits a  higher positive skewness of return than portfolio A. 
Nevertheless  the expected utility or value of  portfolio A is greater than that of 
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portfolio B. Consequently the example demonstrates that a KT agent can optimally  
prefer a portfolio with lower skewness than another when both exhibit the same 
expected return and variance.  
 
Conclusions. 
We have demonstrated with examples that in CPT, as with expected utility theory, it 
is not true to state that agents will prefer gambles that exhibit more positive 
skewness. In fact in model one we show that the agent can require a higher 
expected return to compensate for greater positive skewness. In the model two we 
show that a portfolio that has the same expected return and variance as another 
but lower positive skewness is preferred.   
 
References 
Barberis, N. and Huang, M. (2005) “Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of 
Probability Weighting for Security Prices”, Yale University and Stanford / Cheung 
Kong GSB 
 
Bassett, G.W. (1987), “The St. Petersburg Paradox and Bounded Utility”, History of 
Political Economy, 1987, v. 19, n. 4, reprinted in Expected Utility, Fair Gambles and 
Rational Choice, O.F. Hamouda and J.C.R. Rowley editors, Elger, 1997.
Brockett, P.L. and Garven, J.R. (1998) “A Reexamination of the Relationship 
between Preference and Moment Orderings by Rational Risk Averse Investors”, 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 23,pp127-137. 
 
Budd Report (2001) Gambling Review Report, Report of the Gambling Review 
Body: Cm 5206, July 2001. 
Page 10 of 12
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
11
Cain, M. and Peel, D. A.  (2004) “Utility and Skewness of Return in Gambling”, ” 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 29,pp145-163. 
 
Cain, M., Law, D. and Peel, D. A. (2002) “Skewness as an Explanation of Gambling 
by Locally Risk-Averse Agents”, Applied Economics Letters, pp1025-28. 
 
Cain, M., Law, D. and Peel, D. A. (2005) “Cumulative Prospect Theory and 
Gambling” mimeo University of Lancaster. 
 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk”, Econometrica, Vol.47.No2.pp263-291. 
 
Kraus, A. and R. Litzenberger (1976), “Skewness Preference and the Valuation of 
Risky Assets,” Journal of Finance 31, 1085-1100 
 
Taleb, N.N. (2004), "Bleed or Blowups: What Does Empirical Psychology Tell Us 
About the Preference For Negative Skewness? ", Journal of Behavioural Finance,
5, 2004. 
 Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman (1992), “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323. 
 
Footnotes. 
i They prove and show with simple examples that expected utility preferences never 
universally translate into moment preferences. In particular they show that there 
always exists two continuous unimodal random variables X and Y with identical 
means and variances but greater positive skew in the X variable. Nevertheless the   
preference relationship for the decision maker is exactly reversed, so that the 
expected utility of Y is greater than X. The justification of skewness preference 
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relating is often characterized by arguments invoking a "ceteris paribus” condition, 
which is intended to separate out the effect of higher order moments (and thus to 
focus solely upon the utility differences resulting from changes in skewness alone). 
Cain et al (2002) and Cain and Peel (2005)  illustrate the logical fallacy in the 
context of simple mixed gambles in non-CPT models.  
.
ዊ�ዊ� National Premium bonds are tax-free and the expected return was recently raised 
to 3.2 per cent. A higher-rate taxpayer would have to earn a gross rate of around 
5.33 per cent to exceed this and a standard rate taxpayer around 4%. The safe rate 
of interest always appears higher than the rate for a standard rate taxpayer and for 
many periods also for a higher ratepayer. Premium bonds have multiple prizes (like 
a lottery ticket with N prizes). The chances of winning any prize are 24,000 to 1 
since 1 September 2004. The top prize is one million.  The minimum purchase is 
£100
iii Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assumed the value function was of the power form 
with the same exponent over gains and losses. This specification is not appropriate 
for analyzing mixed gambles. For equal exponents stake size is indeterminate. With 
appropriately different exponents the agent becomes infinitely gain loving rather 
than loss averse over small (and also optimal stake gambles) violating the loss 
aversion assumption in CPT.  
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